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RECENT CASES
PROCEDURE
PLEADING OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN
INDIANA.
Plaintiff was injured by the alleged negligence of the
defendant in driving his automobile into plaintiff, a pedes-
trian, who was crossing a street. The trial court granted
the defendant leave to amend his answer by interlineation,
setting up the defense of contributory negligence. This was
done at the conclusion of the evidence and after the witnesses
had departed. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that this
was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court, and that
the defense of contributory negligence could be proved under
a specific denial.' Holt -. Basore, 77 N.E.2d 903 (Ind. App.
1948).
Because of continued legislative action in the field of
court procedure in which the Rules of the Supreme Court
have vitality, several problems arise in regard to the pleading
and proof of contributory negligence in actions for personal
injuries; actions for property damage; and actions joining
these two.
Indiana has had a variety of rules in regard to pleading
and proving contributory negligence. Prior to legislative
regulation in the field, the plaintiff both in actions for per-
sonal injuries and in those for property damage, was required
to plead and prove, eithbr by direct averment or by the state-
ment of the facts and circumstances under which the injury
occurred, that the plaintiff was without negligence.2 This
rule remained in effect until 1899, when the legislature en-
acted a statute concerning actions for personal injury or
death. That statute requires the defendant to prove as a
defense the plaintiff's contributory negligence where the cause
of action is based on personal injury or death.3 However,
1. The judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered because of
error in refusing to give an instruction tendered by the plain-
tiff, on another point.
2. Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102 (1861); Lake Erie
& W. R. Co. v. Hancock, 15 Ind. App. 104, 43 N.E. 659 (1896).
Cf. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 96 Ind. 40 (1884).
Thus contributory negligence had to be negatived in plaintiff's
complaint.
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-1025. "In all actions for
damages brought on account of the alleged negligence of any
person . . . for causing personal injuries, or the death of any
person, it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff in such action
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following the passage of this statute, in actions to recover
damages for injuries to property only, it w as held that the
plaintiff must plead and prove that he was not guilty of
negligence contributing to the injury, since the foregoing
statute did not apply.4 But further legislative regulation has
occurred. By an act of 1937, a plaintiff may unite a cause
of action for injuries to pdrson and a cause of action for
damage to property.5 And in 1943, the legislature further
provided that in actions charging "... negligence as the cause
of personal injuries or death, and also as the cause of damage
to personal property, or as causing such damage alone . . .
the burden of pleading and proof upon the issue of the plain-
tiff's or decedent's contributory negligence shall rest upon the
defendant in such action."6  Thus, the legislature attempted
to place the burden of pleading and proof of contributory
negligence on the defendant in a combined action for personal
injuries and property damage and, by the use of the italicized
words, to provide the same rule in a cause of action for prop-
erty damage alone. This would place the burden on the de-
fendant in all actions where contributory negligence is a
factor.7
Since the instant case was an action for personal injuries,
the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence
was on the defendant. The plaintiff assumed that the de-
fendant must specially plead this defense. The basis of the
plaintiff's assumption was that §2-305,8 which does not pre-
scribe the pleading device to be used by the defendant, was
to allege or prove the want of contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff.. . . Contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff shall be a matter of defense, and such defense may be
proved under the answer of general denial." See Heiny v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 221 Ind. 367, 47 N.E.2d 145 (1943).
4. Keltner v. Patton, 204 Ind. 550, 185 N.E. 270 (1933); Gagle v.
Heath, 114 Ind. App. 566, 53 N.E.2d 547 (1944).
5. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-304.
6. [Italics added] Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-305. It is
clear that this section does not in any way affect §2-1025 since§2-305 deals only with property damage and combined actions
while §2-1025 affects personal injury actions only.
7. For convenience in judicial administration one rule is desirable.
"1 . . there should be clearly one rule as to contributory negli-
gence." Gavit, "New Federal Rules and Indiana Procedure," 13
Ind. L. J. 195, 216 (1938). See also 1 Works' "Indiana Practice,"§13.42 (Lowe's Rev. 1947).
8. Supra n.6. The plaintiff apparently sought to avoid §2-1025
which specifically provides that the defense of contributory negli-
gence can be proved under a general denial. See n.3, supra.
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controlling. The defendant contended that that section ap-
plied only to those cases where actions for personal injuries
and property damage are joined. The court found it unneces-
sary to determine this point, deciding that Rule 1-3 of the
Supreme Court Rules 9 governed the case, and that since prior
to the adoption of Rule 1-3, "contributory negligence in a
personal injury action was provable under a general denial,
it continues to be so provable."1o In so holding the court
stated that the superior authority for making rules of court
practice lies in the Supreme Court, not in the legislature, by
reason of statute 1 and inherent power.12 Since at the time of
the enactment of §2-305, the rule of the Supreme Court was
in force, the "legislative enactment in conflict therewith would
necessarily be ineffective."'13
In resting its conclusion on the supremacy of the Supreme
Court in procedural rule-making rather than construing
§2-30514 the court left unanswered what it will do when a
9. " . . .all defenses shall be provable under a specific denial or
statement of no information, which were heretofore available
under an answer or reply in general denial.... "
10. Obviously the court meant that evidence of contributory negli-
gence could be introduced under the defendant's specific denial
as well as under an affirmative pleading, since Rule 1-3 elimi-
nates the device of a general denial in such a case.
11. Ind. Stat, Ann. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-4718. "All statutes re-
lating to practice and procedure in any of the courts of this state
shall have, and remain in, force and effect only as herein pro-
vided. The Supreme Court shall have the power to adopt, amend,
and rescind rules of court which shall govern and control practice
and procedure in all the courts of this state; such rules to be
promulgated and to take effect under such rules as the Supreme
Court shall adopt, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force and effect ... "
12. Preface to Rules of Supreme Court: "Pursuant to its inherent
rule-making power and the authority vested in it by the General
Assembly, the Supreme Court of Indiana hereby adopts the follow-
ing rules of court."
13. 77 N.E.2d 903, 904 (Ind.App. 1948). There seems to be ample au-
thority for this proposition. State ex rel. Fostus v. Johnson, 69 N.E.
2d 592 (nd. 1946); Seagram and Sons v. Board, 220 nd. 604, 45
N.E.2d 491 (1943); Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 nd. 190, 131 N.E. 518
(1921). See 1 Gavit, "Indiana Pleading and Practice," §21(9): "It
should be held that the Supreme Court takes precedence over a con-
flicting legislative rule in the same field." See also Ridgely, "The
Indiana Rule-Making Act," 18 nd. L. J. 1 (1937); Note, "The Rule-Making Power," 22 Ind. L. 3. 284 (1947), for a collation of cases
dealing with the permissible extnt of legislative regulation of judi-
cial procedure in Indiana.
14. Supra n.6. It should be noted that the court could have based
its conclusion on Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-1025
which seems to be more clearly relevant than §2-305 and which
is in harmony with Rule 1-3.
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plaintiff joins a cause of action for personal injuries and
property damage or brings an action for property damage
only under §§2-304 and 2-305, where the defendant attempts
to introduce evidence of contributory negligence under a
denial.15 It is difficult to see how §2-305 can be interpreted
so as not to conflict with Rule 1-1 of the Supreme Court Rules.
The latter states that ". . . all other rules of procedure and
practice applicable to trial courts adopted by statutory en-
actment and in effect on June 21, 1937... shall continue in
full force and effect, except as herein otherwise provided."
By implication and under §2-4718,"" statutory enactments re-
lating to court procedure adopted after June 21, 1937, are of
no effect. There is also a conflict with Rule 1-3 since prior
to the passage of §2-305 the burden of pleading and proof of
absence of contributory negligence was on the plaintiff in an
action for property damage only, and hence contributory neg-
ligence was not "heretofore"'1 provable under a general denial.
Thus, although §2-305 does not in terms purport to change
the procedural device to be used in raising the question of
contributory negligence, this conflict exists because the statute
places the burden of proof of contributory negligence on the
defendant and necessarily the defendant must use some pro-
cedural device in pleading the plaintiff's negligence. It is
mere tautology to.state that this device must differ from that
used where the plaintiff had the onus of raising the question.
Apparently, therefore, §2-305 conflicts with two Rules of the
Supreme Court where an action for property damage only
is concerned.
In a combined action for personal injuries and property
damage, the situation is even more confused. A plaintiff may
join the actions under §2-304 since that section was passed
prior to June 21, 1937, and has not been superseded by any of
the Supreme Court Rules. But if §2-305, the 1943 act, is
invalid because of conflict with the Rules of the Supreme
Court, the trial courts are faced with the problem of having
the burden of pleading and proving the absence of contribu-
15. The defendant can avoid this problem by the use of an affirma-
tive answer alleging the plaintiff's contributory negligence. How-
ever, in so doing, defendant may prejudice himself by erroneously
assuming the burden of proof, if §2-305 is indeed invalid because
of a conflict with the Rules of the Supreme Court.
16. Supra n.l1.
17. Supra n.9.
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tory negligence on the plaintiff in regard to the property
damage, while the burden is on the defendant in regard to the
personal injuries,18 where both causes of action are alleged to
arise out of the same act of negligence.
It is apparent that great difficulty would be encountered
in trying to resolve these questions without further pronounce-
ment from the rule-making authority. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court should, under its rule-making
power, promulgate a rule resolving the anomalous situation
resulting from the principal case.
18. This result seems inescapable if §2-305 is invalid, since §2-1025,
placing the burden on the defendant in personal injury actions
alone, is in harmony with and assimilated into the Supreme Court
Rules; and the previous rule, leaving the burden on the defendant
in property damage actions, would remain in force.
